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ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED FEE-FOR-SERVICE FUND 







The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
overview of the implementation of a Fee For Service (FFS) structure for the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  The goal of this project was to identify and 
document the applicability of a FFS in DCMA by comparing the seemingly redundant 
services provided by both the Program Management Offices and DCMA.  Furthermore, 
this project analyzed the potential cost savings of a FFS achieved by forcing the PMO to 
pay for the services themselves vice utilizing DCMA as a “free” service provider.  The 
Author’s contention is NOT that DCMA is inefficient but that the system for identifying, 
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 Given the Human Capital shortage in the Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA or Agency), this paper will analyze the implementation affects of a Fee-For-
Service Fund (FFS) funding option to improve the performance, responsiveness, and 
readiness of the Agency.  DCMA, like every other element of the DoD Acquisition 
workforce, must be flexible to budgetary shortfalls and Human Capital shortages that are 
impacting all DoD acquisition organizations1. Additionally, in making changes for 
efficiency, the tasking of doing more with less, the Agency must employ measurable 
efforts that allow the organization to adequately meet and exceed the needs of DCMA’s 
primary stakeholders (DCMA associates, Program Managers, War Fighters, and Tax 
Payers).   
 Collectively, LCDR Dan Wilcox, USN, and Capt Jamie Rhone, USAF, 
(Collectively referred to as the “Author”) have more than five years of experience in the 
Agency and have amassed a wealth of experiential data to support this analysis.  
(ATTACHMENT #1). 
 Throughout this paper, the Author will examine the current state of the Agency, 
the human capital shortage, the FFS option, and demonstrate the savings afforded to the 
acquisition process by following the FFS structure which totals more than $15.9M for the 
eight programs evaluated. This project will focus on the systematic inefficiencies in 
identifying, procuring, and funding DCMA’s services.    
 The FFS is not an end all be all solution to solve the problems of the DoD 
Acquisition corps.  It is, however, a model to reduce redundancies (in an already resource 
constrained environment), increase efficiencies making the workforce more lean, and 
continue to provide the same world class contract administration services that are 
required to service the DoD war fighters. 
   
 
 
                                                 
1 A multitude of GAO Reports (GAO-03055, GA0-03-475, GAO-02-630 – just to name a few) describe the 
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I: DCMA BACKGROUND 
 
 
 The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA, or The Agency) is the 
DoD’s contract administration agency, charged with the Contract Management (CM) 
functions outlined in the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) 42 (ATTACHMENT 
B).  DCMA is made up of more than 10,868 multidisciplinary civilian personnel and 637 
active duty military2.  According to its official mission statement, DCMA “…provides 
customer focused acquisition life cycle and combat support to ensure readiness, 
worldwide 24 [hours]/7 [days a week]”.  This official mission statement was unofficially 
amplified by one former DCMA commander, CDR Kent Caldwell3, who stated “In GOD 
We Trust!  Everyone Else We Audit, Inspect, Assess, Evaluate, Monitor or Observe.”  
 The Agency is headquartered in Washington DC and is currently led by Major 
General Darryl Scott.  The Agency workforce is sub-divided into three geographic 
Districts (ATTACHMENT C):  International, West, and East.  The Eastern and Western 
Districts are led by an SES-1 or 06-level US military officers and the International 
District is led by an O-6 level US military officer.   
 The primary operational component of the organizational structure of DCMA is 
the Contract Management Office (CMO) of which there are two types of CMO:  
Geographic CMOs (GEOs) and In-Plant CMOs (Plants).  GEOs are charged with 
performing contract management functions (CM) for all DoD contracts in a certain 
geographic region such as Long Island, New York or Southern California. On the other 
hand, Plants perform contract management for a specific contractor’s facility such as the 
Raytheon plant in Tucson, Arizona.  Plant CMOs support major weapon system programs 
and other large contracts that are deemed to possess sufficient risk to warrant exclusive, 
in-house, day to day observation.  In some cases, hybrid organizations exist, in which a 
geographic office is headquartered in a major plant; for example, the Austin, Texas 
residency under the San Antonio GEO is located in the facilities of Tracor Aerospace, a 
                                                 
2 Demographic data obtained from www.dcma.mil.  Information accessed 16 Jul 05. 
3 CDR (Ret) Kent Caldwell served as the Commander of the DCMA Plant Office, Northrop Grumman (Bethpage 
New York) from 2001 to 2004. 
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mid-level defense contractor.  This residency performs contract administration functions 
both for Tracor (Plant responsibility) and for smaller contractors in the Austin and 
College Station metropolitan areas (Geographic responsibility). 
 The DoD currently spends more than $100 Billion annually to research, develop, 
and acquire weapon systems throughout the country4.  Given the fact that many 
Procuring Contracting Offices are located in a completely different state from that in 
which the work is being performed, DCMA performs the role as the Procuring 
Contracting Officer’s (PCO) onsite contract manager5.  The Agency’s onsite roles 
include, but are not limited to the following: 
• Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) 
• Contract Administrator 
• Procurement Technicians 
• Price Analyst 
• Contract Specialist 
• Program Integrator 
• Industrial Specialist 
• Engineering Support 
• Quality Assurance 
• Software Support 
• Administrative Support 
• Organizational Leadership 
Figure 1.   DCMA’s Primary Contract Management Roles6 
  
 In all, these specialties combine to insure the proper implementation of FAR 42 
CM functions (ATTACHMENT B).  These directives are designed systematically to 
assure the varying needs of the Agency’s stakeholders are met. 
                                                 
4 GAO Report – GA0-02-630. 
5 Note:  DCMA CMOs often boast that they are the PCO’s “eyes and ears”. 
6 Primary roles were identified via phone interview of Mrs. Betty Monroe, Deputy Commander, DCMA Long 
Island.  14 Jul 05. 
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II: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
In his Acquisition Research Working Paper titled “Engagement Versus 
Disengagement”7, E. Cory Yoder, Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School of Business 
and Public Policy, identifies the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) as drivers behind the circa 1990 DoD 
acquisition workforce reductions.  Yoder states that “…FASA and FARA – with their 
commercial-item designation provisions, which relieved many of the mandatory statutory 
and regulatory requirements applicable to contractors – were also believed to reduce the 
administrative burden on the Federal acquisition communities charged with monitoring 
and compliance:  DCAA and DCMA.8”  Yoder further identifies several “…notable calls 
for reduction…9” of the acquisition workforce to include  
…the Coopers and Lybrand study10 and several GAO11 reports, including 
an April 1996 report entitled, Acquisition Reform: Efforts to Reduce the 
Cost to Manage and Oversee DoD Contracts and a 1997 report entitled, 
Acquisition Reform:  DoD Faces Challenges in Reducing Oversight Costs 
and a July 1998 report entitled, Acquisition Management:  Workforce 
Reductions and Contractor Oversight…12  
The result of FARA, FASA, and other streamlining laws and regulations is that 
the DoD acquisition workforce has been severely cut.  From 1989 to 1999, the DoD 
downsized this workforce by 50% to 124,000 workers13.  DCMA, much like virtually 
every other DoD acquisition organization, is currently being asked to do more with less 
staffing (ATTACHMENT D).    According to Mrs. Betty Monroe, Deputy Commander 
for DCMA Long Island “…DCMA has had a hiring freeze since the mid 90’s…and since 
                                                 
7 Engagement Versus Disengagement:  How Structural & Commercially-Based Regulatory Changes Have 
Increased Government Risks in Federal Acquisitions.  1 Nov 04.  Authored by CDR (Ret) E. Cory Yoder, Lecturer, 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
8 Engagement Versus Disengagement p. 21. 
9 Engagement Versus Disengagement p. 22 
10 The DoD Regulatory Cost Premium:  A Quantitative Assessment.  Coopers & Lybrand/TASC, Inc., Dec 94. 
11 General Accountability Office (GAO). 
12 Engagement Versus Disengagement p. 22. 
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then, we have not hired anyone, with the exception of interns...”14  In addition to the 
hiring freeze, DCMA has experienced a budget cut of three to seven percent each year.15  
Additionally, like the rest of the DoD acquisition community, DCMA has an older 
workforce with a reported average age between 51 and 53 years old16.   
The question for DCMA is this:  How can the Agency continue to perform their 
mission with no realistic expectations of an increased budget and with a workforce that is 
both aging and unlikely to grow?  There are a multitude of options that would answer this 
question.  Possible solutions range from increasing DCMA budgetary resources, to 
increasing DCMA hiring numbers, to increasing the acquisition workforce, to limiting the 
services provided to the DCMA customer.  One possibility is for the Agency to confine 
itself to performing only the value-added tasks identified in FAR Part 42 deemed critical 
to the Program Management Office’s (PMO) success (ATTACHMENT B).  One way to 
limit non-essential services while simultaneously delivering the services deemed essential 
to Agency customers is to force the PMO’s requesting those services to pay for them via 
Fee-for-Service funding (FFS).  By forcing a PMO to pay for services, the PMOs are in 
effect forced to prioritize and budget for the services they need DCMA to perform and 
identifying when they need the services performed within in the acquisition life cycle.  
Simultaneously, DCMA, as a FFS structured organization will be forced to consistently 
strive to performing the requested services as efficiently as possible.  This point is further 
evidenced by the following comments made by Rear Admiral Kenneth Slought17 who 
stated that “Fee-for-Service or Working Capital Funded organizations exist as actual 
businesses.  They must go out and market themselves in order to make money and to 
survive”. 
 
                                                 
13 GAO Report GAO-02-630 – Data as of 3 Sep 1999. 
14 Mrs. Betty Monroe.  Interview conducted 14 Jul 05. 
15 Col Kim Leach.  Commander, DCMA Long Island 2000 – 2003.  Presentation dated 15 Jul 04. 
16 COL (Ret) John Dillard.  Commander, DCMA Long Island 1997 – 2000.   Interview conducted on 18 Aug 05. 
17 Rear Admiral Kenneth D. Slaught, Commander US Navy SPAWAR in a 11 Mar 05 speech to the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
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When envisioning any new change proposal, analogies can be helpful.  The 
following analogy was designed to aid the reader in viewing the problem from the 
perspective of the Author:  
Imagine that your had a lawn boy that did a great job of mowing your 
lawn.  One day you ask him to trim your hedges and he does at no 
additional charge each and every week.  You are impressed with his 
ability to take on and satisfactorily accomplish the additional work.  You 
then ask him to wash your car which he also does at no additional charge 
each and every week.  Chances are you will allow the lawn boy to perform 
these services indefinitely until such time that he approaches you, and 
requests payment for each and every service that he currently performs.  
At this point, you will most likely reevaluate the services that you have 
him performing and decide that you really don’t need him to perform the 
additional services; you only need him to mow your lawn (perform the 
required services). 
The translation:  FAR 42.302(a) specifically outlines functions that the 
“…contracting officer normally delegates…” to DCMA (commonly 
referred to as “required functions”).  Far 42.302(b) further identifies 
functions to be performed “…only when and to the extent specifically 
authorized by the contracting office…” (commonly referred to as 
“optional functions”).  DCMA currently performs the “required functions” 
free of charge to the PMOs.  DCMA also provides many optional 
functions (equivalent to the “hedges” in the above analogy) for the PMO 
in the name of “customer service” that would arguably not be requested by 
the same PMO if they were required to pay for such services.  The 
Author’s contention is that the FFS option would increase the PCO’s 
options.  Under a FFS, the PCO could: 
1. Use DCMA’s services and pay the associated fee;  
2. Perform these “optional functions” in-house or via a commercial contractor; 
or 
3. Opt to not perform the services at all assuming that the services are non-
critical and not otherwise required by law or regulation. 
END OF ANALOGY 
 The Author has first hand experience in the inefficient utilization and 
management of precious DoD resources in the Agency.  The necessity for analysis has 
taken on a more essential role given the fact our nation is currently at war and these 
 8
inefficient practices within the DoD equate to less resources to fund our ongoing fight in 
the Global War on Terrorism.   
 This “inefficient utilization” maybe caused by the use of risk as a basis for the 
allocation of CM services and personnel.  General Scott stated “We [DCMA] are a risk-
based agency; we evaluate programs, and then we move resources around the agency to 
respond to that risk…”18 
The Author agrees with this assessment and has observed the following chain of events: 
1. Program XYZ is awarded and determined, by the PMO, to be a high risk 
program.  The PMO increases it’s staff to affectively deal with the increased 
risk of the program; 
2. The contractor(s), in response to the high risk nature of this program, increase 
their staff to ensure adequate oversight of the risky program; 
3. DCMA, in response to the high risk posture of their customer and the 
contractor that they are charged to oversee, also increases its human capital 
“…resources around the agency to respond to that risk…”19 to ensure 
adequate program oversight. 
 It is understood that one could effectively argue that the reason for the staffing 
redundancies is an intentional check and balance system and that a major reason for 
DCMA’s existence is to ensure the accountability of the PMOs and defense contractors.  
The Author counters this argument by pointing out that no where in the FAR (specifically 
FAR 42) does it outline the role of DCMA as being to perform “check and balance” 
functionalities.  Additionally, this method not only positions redundancies at the PMO 
and DCMA, but also at contractor.  Finally, the Author points out that the DoD oversight 
and accountability function is responsibility of the GAO and the DoD/IG. 
 An important distinction must now be made:  The Author’s contention is NOT 
that DCMA is inefficient but that the system for identifying, procuring, and funding 
DCMA’s services is inefficient.   
                                                 
18 “Oversight Overhaul” by George Cahlink dated 15 Jun 2005.  Accessed from 
http://www.dcma.mil/communicator/files/DCMA_Oversight_Overhaul.pdf on 20 Sep 05. 
19 Same as Footnote 14.   
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III: RESEARCH METHODS 
 This project was motivated by the Author’s collective personal and professional 
experience.  The Author’s initial research has been consolidated into the following 
analysis questions:   
1. “Do non-value added inefficiencies and redundancies exist in DCMA’s 
performance of CM functions?” 
a. What are the redundancies? 
b. Why do they exist? 
c. Are the redundancies deliberate? 
d. What is their scope (are they large or small)? 
2. “If inefficient redundancies exist, would a FFS structure reduce these inefficient 
redundancies thus improving the return on investment for the Agency’s 
stakeholders?” 
 This project will analyze eight programs (three from the Air Force, two from the 
Navy, and three from the Army) comparing the staffing of the PMO to that of the DCMA 
PST (PST).  The comparison will evaluate redundant tasking (if any) being performed by 
both the Program Management Office and the PSTs from DCMA.  For example, does the 
engineer and the earned value management specialist provided by DCMA perform 
identical functions to engineering staff of the PMO?20 
 
US NAVY US AIR FORCE US ARMY 
Tomahawk Cruise Missile F-22 Raptor Patriot Missile (PAC III) 
F/A/EA-18G C-130J THAADS 
- C-17 Standard Missile 
Figure 2.   Population of weapon system programs selected for analysis 
 
                                                 
20 The analysis of the selected programs do not constitute a sampling of any type (from a statistical sense); 
however, they represent a population of programs judgmentally selected by the Author to evaluate efficiencies and 
redundancies among the Program Office, DCMA, and Contractor personnel. 
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 An evaluation of program office staffing, and DCMA staffing will be performed 
via personnel interviews and a review of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) allocations 
associated with each program.  The goal of this evaluation will be the comparison of the 
staffing and tasks performed by a Program Management Office (PMO) of a large 
acquisition program, and the PSTs (PST) provided by DCMA. 
 The primary analysis shall reveal if their indeed exists redundant performance 
practices (redundancies) of numerous CM functions.  
 The secondary analysis shall evaluate if a FFS structure could improve the 
economic efficiencies of the Agency.  This section of analysis will multiply the FTEs 
identified as being redundant (assuming that they exist) by the existing NASA & DCMA 
FFS (NASA Rate)21 of $97.36 per hour to identify the potential savings should the 
program offices adopt this proposed FFS model.  This solution will then be multiplied by 
2,00022. 
An example of our calculation follows: 
Estimated redundant FTEs for a given program = 10  
NASA Rate = $97.36 
Annual Workable Hours = 2,000 
Annual Savings = 10 * $97.36 * 2,000 = $1,947,200 
                                                 
21 Amendment to the Agreement Between the NASA & the DoD for Reimbursing DoD for Contract 
Administration, Contract Audit, and Related Support Services Provided in Support of NASA Contracts.  Dated 27 Oct 
04. 
22 Annual work hours given a 40 hour work week multiplied by 50 workable weeks in a given year. 
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IV: SOLUTION IDENTIFICATION (FFS DEFINED) 
 One possible solution to the problem outlined in Chapter 2 is to modify DCMA’s 
current funding structure and replace it with a FFS.  DCMA is currently funded on an 
annual basis.  DCMA is given its Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding at the 
beginning of the fiscal year to fund its operations for the fiscal year and the funding 
expires at the completion of the fiscal year.   
 A FFS, as authorized by US Code Title 10, Section 2208, is based on funding that 
other governmental organizations transfer to a supporting organization in consideration 
for services performed.  According the DoD Comptroller’s iCenter (iCenter)23, a FFS is 
“…a financial management strategy, and is one of the many ongoing efforts DoD has 
undertaken to streamline operations and extend resources further.”24  FFS is 
accomplished though the use of indefinite fund accounts, which are meant to provide 
funding for a specific function or service and never expire. 
 The iCenter further states that by “…establishing clear customer / provider 
relationships, adopting private-sector techniques for resource management, consolidating 
functions…the working capital fund system provides managers with improved cost and 
performance data for more effective and efficient decision making.” 25  Specific benefits 
of the FFS include26: 
•  Identifying the total or "true" cost of DoD goods and services to Congress, 
military users (buyers), and those who provide goods and services (sellers); 
•  Promoting more efficient and effective allocation and use of resources; 
•  Underlining the cost consequences of choices and allows purchases to be made 
in anticipation of future funded orders; 
•  Providing managers with the financial authority and flexibility to procure and 
use manpower, materials, and other resources more effectively; 
                                                 
23 DoD Comptroller iCenter.  www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dFFS/dFFSintro.htm.  Accessed 21 Sep 05. 
24 DoD iCenter.  www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dFFS/benefits.htm.  Accessed 21 Sep 05. 
25 DoD iCenter.  www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dFFS/benefits.htm.  Accessed 21 Sep 05. 
26 DoD iCenter.  www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dFFS/benefits.htm.  Accessed 21 Sep 05. 
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•  Improving cost estimates and cost control through comparison of estimates and 
actual costs;  
•  Placing customers in the position of critically evaluating purchase prices and 
the quality of goods and services ordered; 
•  Allowing for greater flexibility and security in decision making as there are no 
fiscal year limitations; 
•  Establishes standard prices or stabilized rates and unit prices for goods and 
services furnished. 
 In addition to the afore mentioned benefits, the FFS recommendation encourages 
the PMO to implement a Free Market approach to obtaining their CM services.  One of 
the primary benefits is that a FFS provides PMOs “…with the financial authority and 
flexibility to procure and effectively use manpower, materials, and other resources…”27  
This benefit empowers the PMO to obtain the CM services from the provider-of-choice 
that most meets their needs.  This concept is readily apparent to Mrs. Sally Flavin, 
Deputy Director of DCMA, as evidenced by the following comments:  “Sallie Flavin, 
DCMA’s deputy director, says the agency cannot assume program managers will come to 
it for contract support. They have the option of doing the work themselves or hiring 
private sector consultants. ‘If customers decide they want something else, part of that is 
shame on us because we are not providing what we could,’ she says.”28   
 The FFS will afford the PMO a funding source to procure the CM services 
required to economically and ethically acquire DoD assets.  As previously stated, 2004 
DCMA Customer Surveys currently report that the Agency is meeting customer 
expectations.  It is, however, notable that as late as 2001, DCMA Director Major General 
Darryl Scott, then Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting (SAF/AQC), 
“…delivered a tough assessment of DCMA, outlining numerous flaws and concluding 
that working with the agency was frustrating.  ‘We [DCMA] were too internally focused.  
We cared more about our own process than we did in results and service,’ Scott says 
                                                 
27 DoD iCenter.  www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dFFS/freemarket.htm.  Accessed 21 Sep 05. 
28 “Oversight Overhaul” by George Cahlink dated 15 Jun 2005.  Accessed from 
http://www.dcma.mil/communicator/files/DCMA_Oversight_Overhaul.pdf on 20 Sep 05. 
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now.”29  Under the FFS structure, a DCMA customer would be given the opportunity to 
reallocate his/her funding and potentially procure the CM services from an organization 
that was more customer focused and more capable of meeting his needs. 
 A consequence of the free market element of FFS is that it implements the 
ultimate accountability system onto the Agency.  In a free market system, if an 
organization fails to satisfy the customer, the customer is free to find another service 
provider, a point foot stomped by Mrs. Falvin when she said that PMOs“…have the 
option of doing the work themselves or hiring private sector consultants…”30 
 The Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) provides an excellent example of 
the how funding mechanisms work in a working capital fund organization.  TRANSCOM 
is similar to DCMA in that both organizations are sovereign agencies of the Department 
of Defense that service all branches of the armed forces as well as other federal 
government and state government organizations.  When a defense department 
organization needs the services of TRANSCOM they will transfer operating funds from 
their organization to the indefinite operating fund account of the Transportation 
Command. The amounts of funds transferred are agreed upon by both organizations by 
using published predetermined overhead rates and direct costs for the method of 
transportation (ship, contract aircraft services, etc.).   
 By applying a FFS structure to DCMA, the PMO would identify the CM services 
that they determine necessary and fund DCMA accordingly, just as TRANSCOM 
provides their services to the Defense Department.   
 This recommended solution would not be complete without mentioning the 
existing precedence for FFS within DCMA.  FFS is currently being used by a NASA to 
reimburse DCMA for CM services31.  Under this agreement, CMOs are required to 
document and periodically report the total number of hours used in support of NASA.  
                                                 
29 “Oversight Overhaul” by George Cahlink dated 15 Jun 2005.  Accessed from 
http://www.dcma.mil/communicator/files/DCMA_Oversight_Overhaul.pdf on 20 Sep 05. 
30 Same as 35. 
31 Amendment to the Agreement Between NASA and DoD for Reimbursing DoD for Contract Administration, 
Contract Audit and Related Support Services Provided in Support of NASA Contracts.  Dated 27 Oct 04. 
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These hours are then billed to NASA at the rates agreement to under the current fiscal 
year pricing agreement.   
 A Working Capital funding structure would create an environment in which 
DCMA would thrive on performing CM services while simultaneously allowing the 
program manager’s of large value programs to have more control of the oversight that 
DCMA provides. 
 It is notable that this recommendation applies only to the DCMA Plant offices.  
The reason for this discrimination is that the Plants have been stood up in support of a 
major program or group of programs located at a specific contractor’s plant.  Each of 
program is managed by a PMO that can identify and pay for the CM resources required 
by the program.   
 GEOs have been excluded from this recommendation for the two following 
reasons: 
1. Continued Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding of the GEOs would 
ensure at least a consistent source of funding for DCMA; 
2. GEOs perform CM functions for contracts that are not covered by a specified 
PMO to direct the FFS requirements. 
 Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned distinction between the applicability of the 
FFS to Plants and GEOs, the question remains “what minimum service levels (with 
associated funding) will be required by DCMA Plants to meet minimum operating 
costs?”  To adequately respond to this issue in a purely free market manner 
(understandably idealistic) would be to simply say that if the Plants fail to perform to 
their customer’s needs, the given Plant will fail!  The end-state is similar to any other 
organization that consistently fails to meet its customer’s needs.  The laws of supply and 
demand would ensure that another organization (governmental or commercial), capable 
of performing the CM functions, would step up and fulfill the mission previously 
accomplished by the given DCMA Plant office.  This is the essence of a free market 
system in its purest, and most idealistic, sense.  It is once again relevant to reiterate the 
necessity for Agency transformation as stressed by General Harrington when he said “...if 
you think change is difficult – try irrelevancy!” 
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 In a more realistic sense, understanding that the DoD doesn’t operate in a purely 
free market system, the PMOs could be required to fund the Plant offices, at least during 
an initial transitional period at a minimal level to ensure the Plant’s operating costs are 
covered.  This could be accomplished via the identification of minimum CM functions 
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V: THE QUESTION OF REDUNDANCY 
 The Author’s contention has been that the services provided by DCMA in support 
of the PMO is redundant and consists of tasks that are currently being done by others 
(either on PMO staff or on the contractor’s staff).  The following question emerges:  Is 
this an intended redundancy or an unintended inefficiency? 
 Two potential answers to this question are explored in this section.  (1) The DoD 
acquisition leadership intended this redundancy as a safe guard over the tax payers 
dollars or (2) This redundancy has emerged over time as an unintended inefficiency. 
 (1). What if the DoD acquisition leadership actually intended DCMA to perform 
functions similar and often redundant to those performed by the PMO?  One could argue 
that this could be a good thing in terms of protecting lives of our troops.  This argument 
would further identify the fact that the DoD acquisition world differs from its commercial 
counterpart in that the acquisitions made in the DoD, more often than not, have a direct 
impact on life or death!   
 This argument could also contend that the DoD acquisition system, like many 
other critical systems (space shuttle, air planes, submarines, etc.), requires redundant 
systems to ensure its success and the benefits paid for these redundancies far out weigh 
any associated costs. 
 (2). What if this redundancy is a unintended inefficiency?  The other side of this 
argument is that DCMA, for a myriad of reasons, has become an unintended inefficiency.  
Argument (1) states that the DoD acquisition system is unique given its direct effects on  
the livliehood of our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen.  This argument would reject 
this contention and identify the fact that many civilian “programs” also have a direct 
impact on life and death and are produced without any DCMA-like oversight at very high 
degrees of both safety and efficiency.   
 The Author’s spoke to two senior level leaders from two large, but different, DoD 
contractors (BAE Systems and Raytheon) and a former DCMA Commander.   Both of 
the civilian leaders stated that their primary contact for their programs of responsibility 
were the PMO.  They both further stated that they did have DCMA plant offices but that 
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the PMO remained their primary point of contact quite simply because “…they controlled 
the money.”  This fact was further foot-stomped by the former DCMA Commander that 
was interviewed when stated that he felt as if “…DCMA was a third party to a two party 
dance.” 
 Now the counter argument, presumably similar to the opinions many DMCA 
proponents, would be that DCMA performs a critical function in support of the 
Warfighter.  In fact, the Agency’s own website states that “We are the Department's 
[DoD] contract manager, responsible for ensuring Federal acquisition programs, supplies, 
and services are delivered on time, within cost or price, and meet performance 
requirements.32”  If DCMA is performing this function, then why do many contractors by 
pass their in-house Plant offices to contact the PMO who is, in many cases, in a totally 
different state? 
 The Author’s contend that the answer to this question is simply because DCMA, 
in its current application, is indeed redundant to the PMO.   It is understandable that the 
Agency proponents would argue that DCMA performs a valuable service to the 
Warfighter and the taxpayer and this maybe true but at what cost?  If the exact functions 
of a Plant CMO can be replaced or performed by the PMO or Contractor, then are we 
indeed doing the Warfighter and the taxpayer a disservice by allowing this redundancy? 
 The final argument in support of the contention that DCMA, in its current 
application, is redundant is the fact that the FAR is silent to this need for redundancy.  
That’s right, FAR part 42 (ATTACHMENT B), the exhaustive list of required and 
elective functions to be performed by DCMA says nothing about the necessity for 
DCMA to be redundant to the PMO.  Furthermore, nowhere in the more that 1,973 pages 
of the FAR33 does it mention the need for this redundancy.  
                                                 
32 www.dcma.mil.  Accessed 8 Nov 05. 
33 http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/pdf/FAR.book.pdf.  Accessed 8 Nov 05. 
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VI: DATA ANALYSIS 
 At the heart of this project is the comparison of staffing resources dedicated to the 
contract management tasks that are currently requested to ensure the successful 
acquisition of high-cost, critical weapon systems and mission-essential DoD equipment.  
Successful acquisition can be defined as providing weapon systems and mission essential 
equipment that meets the performance requirements of the contract (performance 
criteria), is with-in budget (cost criteria), and is delivered to the war-fighter on time 
(schedule criteria).   
 Recent debate, inspired by the U.S. Air Force’s controversial attempt at leasing 
refuel tanker aircraft, in the congress has resulted in influential members of both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate calling for an increase to contractor oversight 
regarding the acquisition of large weapon systems and DoD equipment. Senator John 
McCain has been one of the most vocal critics of DoD acquisition Program 
Management.34  The Washington Post reported that “The Air Force's problems are a 
‘glaring example of a management and oversight failure in our acquisition 
process…clearly, we need to examine the whole procurement process as it works today in 
the Department of Defense35."   
The following data analysis resulted from comparing staffing resources of both 
the PMO and the corresponding DCMA PST.  It is the Authors’ contention that this data 
will provide evidence that DCMA is performing costly and redundant tasks at the Plant 
CMO level that do not provide the beneficial oversight that the Congress is calling for.  It 
is important to note that the research has revealed that DCMA performs core contract 
management functions that are vital to successful acquisition programs for the DoD and 
no cost effective replacement for the Agency exist. However, there is a large quantity of 
staffing that DCMA dedicates to performing tasks that provide questionable benefit to the 
PMO and the overall mission of DoD acquisition, as outlined and directed by DoD 
Directive 5000.1.  It is these tasks that this research is aimed at reducing. 
                                                 
34 www.mccain.senate.gov, Office of Senator John McCain, press release 14 Apr  03.  
35 Washington Post.  McCain Seeks Review Of Pentagon Buying.   15 Apr 05. 
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 The data analysis identifies the staffing FTEs of staffing that the PMO and 
DCMA should examine to determine its value and necessity.  As identified in the 
Research Methods chapter, the FTEs identified for elimination will be multiplied by the 
NASA rate.  Under the proposed FFS system, the monies saved by the PMO will equate 
to a dollar for dollar savings directly attributable to the analyzed program. The dollar 
figures of the potential savings are not the ultimate goal of the project, but the identified 
savings serve as measurements of the magnitude of the choice that the PMs face in 
evaluating the CM services that DCMA provides. 
        The data of current staffing resources used in management and oversight of 
contracts associated with large acquisition programs was requested of nine program 
offices and the corresponding DCMA Plant offices located in the contractor’s facility that 
services these programs.  The nine programs are: Patriot Missile (lower tier), Theater 
High-Altitude Air Defense (THAADS), Standard Missile, AIM-9X Missile, Tomahawk 
Missile, F-18, C-17, F-22, and C-130J.  The F-18, did not provide staff resourcing data in 
time for the data analysis to be conducted.  The DCMA PST resourcing, which supported 
both of these programs, was provided.  These programs were analyzed with the 
assumption that the Program Office staffing levels were similar to that of the C-17 
program given that both programs are the same maturity, size and similar types of 
contracts are currently being utilized.    
1.) The Analysis of the THAADS Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management      6 1 in each product office, 3 in Project Management 
Engineers    169 Evenly distributed throughout product offices 
Contract Management 
Specialists        
12 8 configuration management, others distributed 
Business Professionals           47 Contracting Officers, Budget and Cost Analysts 
Information Technology         16    IT support Office 
Logistics Specialists 24 11 in Sustainment office, remainder evenly 
distributed 
Total PMO FTEs 274  




Position     
FTE  
Assignment 
Program Integrator 5 1 primary, and 4 SPIs in Andover, and Huntsville 
Administrative Contracting 
Officer 
3 1 for each DCMA Office 
Deputy Program Integration 1 Assistant to primary 
Engineers 5 throughout program 
Software Specialists 6 throughout program 
Logistics Specialists 5 throughout program 
Property Managers 4 throughout program 
Industrial Specialists 3 throughout program 
Supply Cain Management 1 Sunnyvale Office 
Earned Value Management 4 throughout program 
Quality Assurance 
Specialists 
6 throughout program 
Total DCMA FTEs 43  
Figure 4.   THAADS DCMA FTE Breakdown 
 
      The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to THAADS are spread over three 
separate commands.  The primary office is located at the DCMA Lockheed Martin 
Sunnyvale Command and the Commands of DCMA Raytheon Andover and DCMA 
Huntsville serve as supporting offices.  The staffing redundancies are evident in the 
following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing of six 
spread throughout each of the product offices as well as the main PMO.  The Program 
Office can work with the DCMA Supervisors to maintain communication with the 
various DCMA personnel performing services for the THAADS Program.   
Elimination Potential: 6 Program Integration FTE’s. 
 Engineers – The Program Office has 169 FTEs dedicated as Engineers throughout 
the all the product offices, and in a program that has significant contracts for System 
Design and Development that the Program Office engineers are highly engaged in.  The 
PST does have a need for engineers within the team that can support the ACO for 
purposes of negotiation and pricing, but five engineers appears excessive and is evidence 
of redundant task performance.   
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Elimination Potential: 3 Engineer FTE’s. 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, all 6 FTEs of the DCMA 
PST are redundant task performance.   
Elimination Potential: 6 Software Specialists FTEs. 
 Logistics Specialists – PMO has significant business management resources, all 
five FTEs of the DCMA PST are redundant.  A large contractor has extensive experience 
in product development and manufacturing and a PST that performs Contract 
Management functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an 
Industrial Specialists.  Industrial Specialists are more necessary for surveillance of small 
businesses that do not possess the resources of a large contractor like Lockheed Martin.  
The Logistics Specialists can perform the tracking of deliveries and contract progress that 
the Industrial Specialists are most likely engaged in.   
Elimination Potential: 2 Logistics Specialists FTE’s, 3 Industrial Specialist FTEs.  
 Supply Chain Management – PMO has significant resources in business office 
and each product office has its own business management professional, the one FTE of 
the DCMA PST is redundant task performance.   
Elimination Potential: 1 Supply Chain Management FTE. 
 Earned Value Management – PMO has significant business management 
resources and contract requirements dictate that EVM data is delivered to the PMO; all 
four FTEs of the DCMA PST are redundant task performance.   




A) 6 Program Integration FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks  = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $1,168,320 
B) 3 Engineer FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
       Annual Savings = $584,160 
C) 6 Software Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
       Annual Savings = $1,168,320 
D) 2 Logistics Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
       Annual Savings = $389,440 
E) 1 Supply chain Management x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
        Annual Savings = $194,720 
F) 4 Earned Value Management FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 
weeks = annual savings 
         Annual Savings = $778,880 
 
2.) The Analysis of the Patriot Missile (Lower Tier) Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 3 1 Program Manager, 1 Asst, 1 PM directorate 
Engineers 63 Evenly distributed throughout product offices 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
11 Acquisition Management Directorate 
Business Professionals 40 Program Evaluation, resource management 
Configuration Management 4 Product Directorate 
Logisticians 24 distributed in program 
Total PMO FTEs 145  
Figure 5.   Patriot Missile PMO FTE Breakdown 
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Position FTE  Assignment 




Contract administrator 2.5 Sustainment contracts 
Engineers 1 Primary 
Software Specialists 1 Primary 
Industrial Specialists 1.5 Sustainment Contracts 
Quality Assurance Specialists 1.5 Primary 
Total DCMA FTEs 9.5  
Figure 6.   Patriot Missile DCMA FTE Breakdown 
                                                  
       The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the Patriot Missile (Lower Tier) 
program are performed at the primary office located at DCMA Raytheon Andover 
located in the Raytheon facility in Andover, MA. The staffing redundancies are evident 
in the following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integrator – The Program Office has a management staffing of three 
PMs spread throughout the PMO and also within the Program Management Directorate.  
The Program Office management staff can work with the DCMA Supervisors the 
maintain communication with the various DCMA personnel performing services for the 
Patriot Missile (Lower Tier) Program.   
Elimination Potential: 1 Program Integration FTE’s 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources in the Engineering staffing 
that is are currently engaged in software development; the one FTE in the DCMA PST is 
redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Software Specialists FTE’s 
 Industrial Specialists – The primary contractor for the program, Raytheon 
Andover, MA, is of sufficient size and has a proven capability to perform this contract; 
therefore, an Industrial Specialist for this program is unnecessarily provided by DCMA 
and should be replaced with Procurement Technicians for potential savings due to lower 
labor rates for the Procurement Technicians. 
Elimination Potential:  1.5 Industrialist Specialists FTEs     




A) 1 Program Integration FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
B) 1 Software Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
C) 1.5 Industrial Specialist x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
       Annual Savings = $292,080 
D) Addition: 1.5 Procurement technicians FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week 
x 50 weeks 
       Addition:  $292,080 
 
3.) The Analysis of the F-22 Raptor Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 19 2 in lead office, 2 to 3 in each IPT 
Engineers 180 Evenly distributed throughout product offices 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
24 all in contract management division 
Business Professionals 56 Financial Management, Acquisition and 
Sustainment 
Information Technology 19 IT support/Help desk 
Logisticians 35 Sustainment Division 
Total PMO FTEs 333  
Figure 7.   F-22 PMO FTE Breakdown 
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Position       
FTE
Assignment 
Program Integrator 3 1 primary, and 2 SPIs in Seattle and Fort Worth 
Administrative Contracting 
Officer 
3 1 for each DCMA Office 
Contract Administrators 2 1 in primary, 1 in Seattle 
Deputy Program Integration 1 Assistant to primary 
Engineers   9 throughout program 
Software Specialists 1 throughout program 
Logistics Specialists 2 throughout program 
Property Managers 1 throughout program 
Industrial Specialists 4 throughout program 
Management Analyst 1 In primary office 
Earned Value Management 3 throughout program 
Quality Assurance Specialists 15 throughout program 
Total DCMA FTEs 45  
Figure 8.   F-22 DCMA FTE Breakdown 
 
 The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the F-22 Raptor Program are 
spread over three separate commands.  The primary office is located at the DCMA 
Lockheed Martin Marietta Command and the commands of DCMA Boeing Seattle and 
DCMA Lockheed Martin Fort Worth serve as supporting commands.  The staffing 
redundancies are evident in the following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing of nineteen 
spread throughout each of the product offices as well as the main PMO.  The Program 
Office can work with the DCMA Supervisors (Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain 
communication with the various DCMA personnel performing services for the F-22 
Raptor Program.   
Elimination Potential: 4 Program Integration FTE’s  
 Engineers – The Program Office has 180 FTEs dedicated as Engineers throughout 
the all the product offices, and in a program that has significant contracts for System 
Design and Development, the Program Office engineers are highly engaged.  The PST 
does have a need for engineers within the team that can support the ACO for purposes of 
negotiation and pricing, but nine engineers is excessive and is evidence of redundant task 
performance. 
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Elimination Potential: 6 Engineer FTE’s 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, the one FTE of the DCMA 
PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Software Specialists FTE’s 
 Logistics Specialists – PMO has significant resources, both FTEs of the DCMA 
PST are redundant task performance. A large contractor has extensive experience in 
product development and manufacturing and a PST that performs Contract Management 
functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an Industrial 
Specialists.  Industrial Specialists are more necessary for surveillance of small businesses 
that do not possess the resources of a large contractor like Lockheed Martin.  The 
Procurement Technicians can perform the tracking of deliveries and contract progress 
that the Industrial Specialist is most likely engaged in. 
Elimination Potential: 2 Logistics Specialists FTEs, 4 Industrial Specialists FTEs  
Addition: 4 Procurement Technicians FTEs 
 Management Analyst– PMO has significant resources; the one FTE of the DCMA 
PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Management Analyst FTE 
 Earned Value Management – PMO has significant business management 
resources and contract requirements dictate that EVM data is delivered to the PMO; all 4 
FTEs of the DCMA PST are redundant task performance. 




A) 4 Program Integration FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $778,880 
B) 6 Engineer FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
      Annual Savings = $1,168,320 
C) 1 Software Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
D) 2 Logistics Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
      Annual Savings = $389,440 
E) 1 Management Analyst x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
F) 3 Earned Value Management FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 
weeks = annual      
       savings 
      Annual Savings = $584,160 
G) 4 Industrial Specialist FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $778,880 
H) Addition: 4 Procurement Technician FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week 
x 50 weeks 
      Addition = $778,880 
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4.) The Analysis of the C-17 Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 7 3 in lead office, 1 to 2 in each division 
Engineers   62 Engineering and Modernization divisions 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
14 all in contract management division 
Business Professionals 37 Finance, logistics, and Modernization divisions 
Logisticians 10 Logistics Division 
Total PMO FTEs 130  
Figure 9.   C-17 PMO FTE Breakdown 
 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Integrator 1 Lead Program Integrator 
Administrative Contracting 
Officer 
2.25 1 for each DCMA Office 
Contract Administrators 6.5 Throughout Program 
Deputy Program Integrators 5 Assistant Program Integrators, Throughout 
Program 
Engineers 14 Includes Computer, Aeronautical, Industrial, 
Electrical 
Software Specialists 5 Throughout Program 
Logistics Specialists 1 Throughout Program 
Industrial Specialists 1 Throughout Program 
Financial Specialist .75 Throughout Program 
Quality Assurance Specialists 15 Throughout Program 
Procurement Technician 2.25 Throughout Program 
Property Management 1.5 Throughout Program 
Total DCMA FTEs 55.25
 
 
Figure 10.               C-17 DCMA FTE Breakdown 
                          
 The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the C-17 Program are spread 
over two commands.  The primary office is located at the DCMA Lockheed Martin 
Marietta Command and DCMA Boeing St Louis is a supporting command. The staffing 
redundancies are evident in the following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing adequately 
spread throughout the PMO.  The Program Office can work with the DCMA Supervisors 
(Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain communication with the various DCMA 
personnel performing services for the C-130J Program.   
Elimination Potential: 6 Program Integration FTEs 
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 Engineers – The Program Office has 62 FTEs dedicated as Engineers throughout 
the all the Program office.  The PST does have a need for engineers within the team that 
can support the ACO for purposes of negotiation and pricing, but 14 engineers is 
excessive and is evidence of redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 11 Engineer FTE’s 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, the five FTEs of the 
DCMA PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 5 Software Specialists FTEs 
 Logistics Specialists/Industrial Specialists – PMO has significant resources 
dedicated to logistics, the one FTE of the DCMA PST is redundant task performance. A 
large contractor has extensive experience in product development and manufacturing and 
a PST that performs Contract Management functions regarding large contractors does not 
need the services of an Industrial Specialists.  The one FTE for the Industrial Specialist 
provided by DCMA is evidence of redundant task performance. The order tracking 
functions can be performed by Procurement Technicians at a lower labor rate.  
Elimination Potential: 1 Logistics Specialists FTEs, 1 Industrial Specialist FTE  
Addition: 1 Procurement Technician to replace Industrial Specialists at a lower 
labor rate. 
 Financial Specialist– PMO has significant business management resource; the one 
FTE of the DCMA PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Financial Analyst FTE 
 
Savings: 
A) 6 Program Integration FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $1,168,320 
B) 11 Engineer FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $2,141,920 
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C) 5 Software Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $973,600 
D) 1 Logistics Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
E) 1 Financial Analyst x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
F) 1 Industrial Specialist FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
G) Addition: 1 Procurement Technician FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 
50 weeks 
      Addition = $194,720 
 
 5.) The Analysis of the C-130J Program: 
 The data concerning the staffing resources of the C-130J was not received by the 
program office, but the staffing rescores of the PST was provided by DCMA Lockheed 
Martin Marietta.  For purposes of comparison, the Authors make the assumption that C-
130J and the C-17 programs are similar in size and total contract value, and use the 
similar staffing resources. For the purpose of determining redundancy in task 
performance, the staffing resource data provided from the C-17 program office was used 
as a substitute for the staffing resource data needed for the C-130J.   
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Position FTE Assignment 
Team Supervisors 2 Supervision 
Program Integrator 2 Lead Program Integrators 
Administrative Contracting 
Officer 
2 1 for Sustainment, 1 for Production 
Contract Administrators 6 throughout program 
Engineers 6 Includes Computer, Aeronautical, Industrial, 
Electrical 
Software Specialists 4 Throughout Program 
Industrial Specialists 2 Throughout Program 
Quality Assurance Specialists 11 Throughout Program 
Procurement Technician 4 Throughout Program 
Total DCMA FTEs 39  
Figure 11.   C-130J PMO FTE Breakdown 
 
  The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the C-130J Program are 
concentrated in DCMA Lockheed Martin Marietta. The staffing redundancies are evident 
in the following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing that is 
adequately spread throughout the PMO.  The Program Office can work with the DCMA 
Supervisors (Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain communication with the various 
DCMA personnel performing services for the C-130J Program.   
Elimination Potential: 2 Program Integration FTEs 
 Engineers – The Program Office has adequate engineers dedicated throughout the 
Program office.  The PST does have a need for engineers within the team that can support 
the ACO for purposes of negotiation and pricing, but six engineers is excessive and is 
evidence of redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 4 Engineer FTEs 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, the 4 FTEs of the DCMA 
PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 4 Software Specialists FTEs 
 Industrial Specialists – A large contractor has extensive experience in product 
development and manufacturing, and a PST that performs Contract Management 
functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an Industrial 
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Specialists.  The one FTE for the Industrial Specialist provided by DCMA is evidence of 
redundant task performance. The order tracking functions can be performed by 
Procurement Technicians at a lower labor rate. 
 Elimination Potential: 2 Industrial Specialists FTEs  
Addition: 2 Procurement Technician FTEs 
 
Savings: 
A) 2 Program Integration FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $389,440 
B) 4 Engineer FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $778,880 
C) 4 Software Specialists x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
saving 
     Annual Savings = $778,880 
D) 2 Industrial Specialist FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $389,440 
E) Addition: 2 Procurement Technician FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 
50 weeks 
      Addition = $389,440 
6.) The Analysis of the F/A-18/EA-18G Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 40 10 level I, 30 level II 
Engineers 212 Evenly distributed throughout all level division 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
32 Service to all level II divisions 
Business Professionals 58 Financial Management, Acquisition and 
Sustainment 
Information Technology 19 IT support/Help desk 
Logisticians 35 Logistics/Maintenance 
Total PMO FTEs 396  
Figure 12.   F-18 PMO FTE Breakdown 
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Position FTE Assignment 
Program Integrator 1 primary 
Administrative Contracting 
Officer 
3 Readiness, Systems and Corporate team 
Contract Administrators 12 Readiness and Systems Team 
Engineers 11 Operations and Engineering Support Team 
Software Specialists 2 Engineering Support Team 
Property Managers 1 Corporate Support Team 
Industrial Specialists 3 Operations 
Procurement Technicians 6 Operations 
Management Analyst 1 Corporate Support Team 
Quality Assurance Specialists 15 Operations and Manufacturing Team 
Total DCMA FTEs 55  
Figure 13.   F-18 DCMA FTE Breakdown 
 
 The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the F/A-18/EA-18G Program 
are located at DCMA Boeing St. Louis. The staffing redundancies are evident in the 
following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing of forty 
spread throughout each of the product offices as well as the main PMO.  The Program 
Office can work with the DCMA Supervisors (Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain 
communication with the various DCMA personnel performing services for the F/A-
18/EA-18G Program.   
Elimination Potential: 1 Program Integrator FTE 
 Engineers – The Program Office has 212 FTEs dedicated as Engineers throughout 
the all the level II divisions, and in a program that has significant contracts for System 
Design and Development, the Program Office engineers are highly engaged.  The PST 
does have a need for engineers within the team that can support the ACO for purposes of 
negotiation and pricing, but 11 engineers is excessive and is evidence of redundant task 
performance. 
Elimination Potential: 8 Engineer FTE’s 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, the two FTEs of the 
DCMA PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 2 Software Specialists FTEs 
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 Industrial Specialists- A large contractor, such as Boeing, has extensive 
experience in product development and manufacturing and a PST that performs Contract 
Management functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an 
Industrial Specialists.  The three FTEs for the Industrial Specialist provided by DCMA is 
evidence of redundant task performance. The order tracking functions can be performed 
by Procurement Technicians at a lower labor rate. 
Elimination Potential: 3 Industrial Specialists FTEs  
Addition: 3 Procurement Technician FTEs 
 Management Analyst– PMO has significant business management resources; the 
one FTE of the DCMA PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Management Analyst FTE 
 
Savings: 
A) 1 Program Integration FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
B) 8 Engineer FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = annual 
savings 
     Annual Savings = $1,557,760 
C) 2 Software Specialist FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $389,440 
D) 1 Management Analyst FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $194,720 
E) 3 Industrial Specialist FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
      Annual Savings = $584,160 
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F) Addition: 3 Procurement Technician FTEs x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week 
x 50 weeks 
      Addition = $584,160 
 
 7.) The Analysis of the Tomahawk Missile Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 10 1 Program Manager, 1 Asst, 1 PM directorate 




2 1 PCO, and 1 Supervisor 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
10 Support PCO 
Business Professionals 37 Budget, Finance, management analysis 
Configuration Management 5 System Engineering and Integration 
Logisticians 24 Logistics 
Total PMO FTEs 119  
Figure 14.   Tomahawk PMO FTE Breakdown 
 
Position FTE Assignment 




Contract administrators 2.5 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Engineers 2 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Software Specialists 1 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Industrial Specialists 1 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Procurement Technician 1.5 Depot contracts    
Quality Assurance 
Specialists 
2 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Total DCMA FTEs 12  
Figure 15.   Tomahawk DCMA FTE Breakdown 
 
 The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the Tomahawk Missile 
Program are located at DCMA Raytheon Tucson. The staffing redundancies are evident 
in the following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing of ten 
spread throughout each of the division offices as well as the main PMO.  The Program 
Office can work with the DCMA Supervisors (Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain 
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communication with the various DCMA personnel performing services for the 
Tomahawk Missile Program.   
Elimination Potential: 1 Program Integrator FTE 
 Software Specialists – PMO has significant resources, the Software Specialist 
FTE of the DCMA PST is redundant task performance. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Software Specialist FTE 
 Industrial Specialists- A large contractor, such as Raytheon, has extensive 
experience in product development and manufacturing and a PST that performs Contract 
Management functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an 
Industrial Specialists.  The one FTE for the Industrial Specialist provided by DCMA is 
evidence of redundant task performance. The order tracking functions can be performed 
by a Procurement Technician at a lower labor rate. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Industrial Specialist FTE 
Addition: 1 Procurement Technician FTE 
 
Savings: 
A) 1 Program Integration FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
B) 1 Software Specialist FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
C) 1 Industrial Specialist FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
D) Addition: 1 Procurement Technician FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 
50 weeks 
     Addition = $194,720   
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 8.) Analysis of the Standard Missile (SM2 & SM6) Program: 
Position FTE Assignment 
Program Management 3 Throughout Program 
Engineers 19 Throughout Program 
Procurement Contracting 
Officer 
1 NAVSEA staff 
Contract Management 
Specialists 
3 Support PCO 
Business Professionals 8 throughout program 
Configuration Management 1 SM6 
Logicians 1.5 Logistics 
Total PMO FTEs 36.5  
Figure 16.   Standard Missile PMO FTE Breakdown 
 
Position FTE Assignment 




Contract administrators 3 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Engineers 1 System Development contracts 
Industrial Specialists 1 Depot and Procurement contracts 
Procurement Technician .5 Depot contracts    
Quality Assurance Specialists 1 SM2 Depot 
Total DCMA FTEs 8  
Figure 17.   Standard Missile DMCA FTE Breakdown 
 
 The majority of resources that DCMA dedicates to the Standard Missile Program 
are located at DCMA Raytheon Tucson. The staffing redundancies are evident in the 
following Contract Management Positions: 
 Program Integration – The Program Office has a management staffing of three 
spread throughout each of the product divisions of the PMO.  The Program Office can 
work with the DCMA Supervisors (Team Chiefs and Team Leads) to maintain 
communication with the various DCMA personnel performing services for the 
Tomahawk Missile Program.   
Elimination Potential: .5 Program Integrator FTE 
 Industrial Specialists- A large contractor, such as Raytheon, has extensive 
experience in product development and manufacturing and a PST that performs Contract 
Management functions regarding large contractors does not need the services of an 
Industrial Specialists.  The one FTE for the Industrial Specialist provided by DCMA is 
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evidence of redundant task performance. The order tracking functions can be performed 
by a Procurement Technician at a lower labor rate. 
Elimination Potential: 1 Industrial Specialist FTE 
Addition: 1 Procurement Technician FTE 
Savings: 
A) .5 Program Integration FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $97,360 
B) 1 Industrial Specialist FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 50 weeks = 
annual savings 
     Annual Savings = $194,720 
C) Addition: 1 Procurement Technician FTE x NASA rate (97.36) x 40 hours/week x 
50 weeks 
     Addition = $97,360 
 
Summary of DCMA Elimination Potential: 
 The following DCMA positions were selected as potential elimination: 
 The Earned Value Management Specialists, Management Analyst, Supply Chain 
Management Specialist, Logistics Specialists and Financial Analysis are positions 
used for contractor surveillance of the performance of Business Management 
functions.  Regulations regarding the formation of large contracts mandate contract 
terms that require contractors to submit cost and financial data to the PMO, and the 
PMO are required to monitor the contractor’s performance regarding cost and 
schedule performance. In response to these requirements, the PMO has a large staff of 
business management positions to meet these requirements.   
 The Program Integrator position is primary a customer service position for 
communication and coordination between the PST of DCMA and the PMO, and 
tracking and reporting the DCMA assessment of risk analysis regarding contractor 
performance.  The Program Integrator also has extensive reporting requirements that 
are only meant for DCMA’s internal requirements and serve no purpose to the PMO. 
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The PMO has adequate resources to perform these tasks and there is no protocol or 
regulations that prohibit individuals within the PMO to contact the PST.    
 Engineer and Software Specialist/Engineer have a vital role in helping the 
Administrative Contracting Officer perform the contracting functions that the 
Procuring Contracting Officer has directly requested, but there is no requirement for 
engineering surveillance of contracts when the PMO is performing those functions for 
themselves.  
 The Industrial Specialist is primarily meant to determine and monitor the capacity  
and ability the of contractor’s facility and workforce to successful meet the demands 
of the contracts from the DoD.  Large contractors such as Raytheon or Boeing can 
easily show the resources needed to complete contracts with the DoD.  The real value 
that can gain from the expertise of the Industrial Specialists is providing surveillance 
to contracts that are being performed by small businesses that do not possess the vast 
resources of a large contractor. The task of tracking contract schedules of 
performance and deliveries can be performed by Procurement Technicians at a lower 
labor rate.  
 
Summary of Savings: 
 Total THAADS Program Savings = $2,726,080      
 Total Patriot Missile (Lower Tier) Savings = $389,440 
 Total F-22 Program Savings = $3,310,240 
 Total C-17 Program Savings = $4,673,280  
 Total C-130J Program Savings = $1,947,200 
 Total F/A-18/EA-18G Program Savings = $2,336,640 
 Total Tomahawk Missile Program Savings = $389,440  
 Total Standard Missile (SM2 and SM6) Program Savings = $194,720  
 Grand Total of FFS Savings = $15,967,040.00. 
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ATTACHMENT A. AUTHOR’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
LCDR DAN WILCOX, USN:  Assigned to DCMA Raytheon Tucson AZ, from June 
2002 to June 2004, as an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and Program 
Integrator for the Tomahawk Missile Program. From December 2002 to June 2003 
LCDR Dan Wilcox was deployed to Al Udeed Air Base in Quatar in support of the Air 
Force Contract Augmentation Program as an ACO for construction services.   
 
CAPT JAMIE RHONE, USAF:  Assigned to DCMA Long Island NY in Jun 2002 as the 
Chief of Program Integration.  In this capacity, he managed 13 Program Integrators 
responsible for integrating multidisciplinary teams of contractors and government 
employees to successfully produce the end product.  Capt Rhone was later promoted to 
the Deputy Operations Chief.  In this position, he led 10 Team Leaders (responsible for 
300+ member multidisciplinary government workforce) to successfully perform contract 
management functions to meet and exceed customer requirements.   
 
LCDR Wilcox and Capt Rhone had primary missions to ensure that the interests of each 
of his three customers (PMs, Warfighters, and Tax Payers) were either met or exceeded.   
 
Efforts supported OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH, OPERATION SOUTHERN 
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ATTACHMENT B. FAR 42 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42.0 defines DCMA’s functions. When a 
contract is assigned for administration under Subpart 42.2, the contract administration 
office (CAO) shall perform contract administration functions in accordance with 48 CFR 
Chapter 1, the contract terms, and, unless otherwise agreed to in an interagency 
agreement (see 42.002), the applicable regulations of the servicing agency. 
 
42.302 Contract administration functions. 
(a) The contracting officer normally delegates the following contract administration 
functions to a CAO. The contracting officer may retain any of these functions, except 
those in paragraphs (a)(5), (a)(9), and (a)(11) of this section, unless the cognizant Federal 
agency (see 2.101) has designated the contracting officer to perform these functions. 
 
(1) Review the contractor's compensation structure. 
(2) Review the contractor's insurance plans. 
(3) Conduct post-award orientation conferences. 
(4) Review and evaluate contractors' proposals under Subpart 15.4 and, when negotiation 
will be accomplished by the contracting officer, furnish comments and recommendations 
to that officer. 
(5) Negotiate forward pricing rate agreements (see 15.407-3). 
(6) Negotiate advance agreements applicable to treatment of costs under contracts 
currently assigned for administration (see 31.109). 
(7) Determine the allowability of costs suspended or disapproved as required (see Subpart 
42.8); direct the suspension or disapproval of costs when there is reason to believe they 
should be suspended or disapproved; and approve final vouchers. 
(8) Issue Notices of Intent to Disallow or not Recognize Costs (see Subpart 42.8). 
(9) Establish final indirect cost rates and billing rates for those contractors meeting the 
criteria for contracting officer determination in Subpart 42.7. 
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(10) Attempt to resolve issues in controversy, using ADR procedures when appropriate 
(see Subpart 33.2); prepare findings of fact and issue decisions under the Disputes clause 
on matters in which the administrative contracting officer (ACO) has the authority to take 
definitive action. 
(11) In connection with Cost Accounting Standards (see 30.601 and 48 CFR Chapter 99 
(FAR Appendix)):. 
(i) Determine the adequacy of the contractor's disclosure statements; 
(ii) Determine whether disclosure statements are in compliance with Cost 
Accounting Standards and Part 31; 
(iii) Determine the contractor's compliance with Cost Accounting 
Standards and disclosure statements, if applicable; and 
(iv) Negotiate price adjustments and execute supplemental agreements 
under the Cost Accounting Standards clauses at 52.230-2, 52.230-3, 
52.230-4, 52.230-5, and 52.230-6. 
(12) Review and approve or disapprove the contractor's requests for payments under the 
progress payments or performance-based payments clauses. 
(13) Make payments on assigned contracts when prescribed in agency acquisition 
regulations. 
(14) Manage special bank accounts. 
(15) Ensure timely notification by the contractor of any anticipated overrun or under run 
of the estimated cost under cost-reimbursement contracts. 
(16) Monitor the contractor's financial condition and advise the contracting officer when 
it jeopardizes contract performance. 
(17) Analyze quarterly limitation on payments statements and recover overpayments 
from the contractor. 
(18) Issue tax exemption forms. 
(19) Ensure processing and execution of duty-free entry certificates. 
(20) For classified contracts, administer those portions of the applicable industrial 
security program delegated to the CAO (see Subpart 4.4). 
(21) Issue work requests under maintenance, overhaul, and modification contracts. 
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(22) Negotiate prices and execute supplemental agreements for spare parts and other 
items selected through provisioning procedures when prescribed by agency acquisition 
regulations. 
(23) Negotiate and execute contractual documents for settlement of partial and complete 
contract  terminations for convenience, except as otherwise prescribed by Part 49. 
(24) Negotiate and execute contractual documents settling cancellation charges under 
multiyear contracts. 
(25) Process and execute notation of change of name agreements under Subpart 42.12. 
(26) Perform property administration (see Part 45). 
(27) Approve contractor acquisition or fabrication of special test equipment under the 
clause at 52.245-18, Special Test Equipment. 
(28) Perform necessary screening, redistribution, and disposal of contractor inventory. 
(29) Issue contract modifications requiring the contractor to provide packing, crating, and 
handling services on excess Government property. When the ACO determines it to be in 
the Government's interests, the services may be secured from a contractor other than the 
contractor in possession of the property. 
(30) In facilities contracts- 
(i) Evaluate the contractor's requests for facilities and for changes to existing facilities 
and provide appropriate recommendations to the contracting officer; 
(ii) Ensure required screening of facility items before acquisition by the contractor; 
(iii) Approve use of facilities on a noninterference basis in accordance with the clause at 
52.245-9, Use and Charges; 
(iv) Ensure payment by the contractor of any rental due; and 
(v) Ensure reporting of items no longer needed for Government production. 
(31) Perform production support, surveillance, and status reporting, including timely 
reporting of potential and actual slippages in contract delivery schedules. 
(32) Perform pre-award surveys (see Subpart 9.1). 
(33) Advise and assist contractors regarding their priorities and allocations 
responsibilities and assist contracting offices in processing requests for special assistance 
and for priority ratings for privately-owned capital equipment. 
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(34) Monitor contractor industrial labor relations matters under the contract; apprise the 
contracting officer and, if designated by the agency, the cognizant labor relations advisor, 
of actual or potential labor disputes; and coordinate the removal of urgently-required 
material from the strikebound contractor's plant upon instruction from, and authorization 
of, the contracting officer. 
(35) Perform traffic-management services, including issuance and control of Government 
bills of lading and other transportation documents. 
(36) Review the adequacy of the contractor's traffic operations. 
(37) Review and evaluate preservation, packaging, and packing. 
(38) Ensure contractor compliance with contractual quality assurance requirements (see 
Part 46). 
(39) Ensure contractor compliance with contractual safety requirements. 
(40) Perform engineering surveillance to assess compliance with contractual terms for 
schedule, cost, and technical performance in the areas of design, development, and 
production. 
(41) Evaluate for adequacy and perform surveillance of contractor engineering efforts 
and management systems that relate to design, development, production, engineering 
changes, subcontractors, tests, management of engineering resources, reliability and 
maintainability, data control systems, configuration management, and independent 
research and development. 
(42) Review and evaluate for technical adequacy the contractor's logistics support, 
maintenance, and modification programs. 
(43) Report to the contracting office any inadequacies noted in specifications. 
(44) Perform engineering analyses of contractor cost proposals. 
(45) Review and analyze contractor-proposed engineering and design studies and submit 
comments and recommendations to the contracting office as required. 
(46) Review engineering change proposals for proper classification, and when required, 
for need, technical adequacy of design, producibility, and impact on quality, reliability, 
schedule, and cost; submit comments to the contracting office. 
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(47) Assist in evaluating and make recommendations for acceptance or rejection of 
waivers and deviations. 
(48) Evaluate and monitor the contractor's procedures for complying with procedures 
regarding restrictive markings on data. 
(49) Monitor the contractor's value engineering program. 
(50) Review, approve or disapprove, and maintain surveillance of the contractor's 
purchasing system (see Part 44). 
(51) Consent to the placement of subcontracts. 
(52) Review, evaluate, and approve plant or division-wide small, small disadvantaged 
and women-owned small business master subcontracting plans. 
(53) Obtain the contractor's currently approved company- or division-wide plans for 
small, small disadvantaged and women-owned small business subcontracting for its 
commercial products, or, if there is no currently approved plan, assist the contracting 
officer in evaluating the plans for those products. 
(54) Assist the contracting officer, upon request, in evaluating an offeror's proposed 
small, small disadvantaged and women-owned small business subcontracting plans, 
including documentation of compliance with similar plans under prior contracts. 
(55) By periodic surveillance, ensure the contractor's compliance with small, small 
disadvantaged and women-owned small business subcontracting plans and any labor 
surplus area contractual requirements; maintain documentation of the contractor's 
performance under and compliance with these plans and requirements; and provide 
advice and assistance to the firms involved as appropriate. 
(56) Maintain surveillance of flight operations. 
(57) Assign and perform supporting contract administration. 
(58) Ensure timely submission of required reports. 
(59) Issue administrative changes, correcting errors or omissions in typing, contractor 
address, facility or activity code, remittance address, computations which do not require 
additional contract funds, and other such changes (see 43.101). 
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(60) Cause release of shipments from contractor's plants according to the shipping 
instructions. When applicable, the order of assigned priority shall be followed; shipments 
within the same priority shall be determined by date of the instruction. 
(61) Obtain contractor proposals for any contract price adjustments resulting from 
amended shipping instructions. Review all amended shipping instructions on a periodic, 
consolidated basis to ensure that adjustments are timely made. Except when the ACO has 
settlement authority, the ACO shall forward the proposal to the contracting officer for 
contract modification. The ACO shall not delay shipments pending completion and 
formalization of negotiations of revised 
shipping instructions. 
(62) Negotiate and/or execute supplemental agreements, as required, making changes in 
packaging subcontractors or contract shipping points. 
(63) Cancel unilateral purchase orders when notified of non-acceptance by the contractor. 
The CAO shall notify the contracting officer when the purchase order is canceled. 
(64) Negotiate and execute one-time supplemental agreements providing for the 
extension of contract delivery schedules up to 90 days on contracts with an assigned 
Criticality Designator of C (see 42.1105). Notification that the contract delivery schedule 
is being extended shall be provided to the contracting office.  Subsequent extensions on 
any individual contract shall be authorized only upon concurrence of the contracting 
office. 
(65) Accomplish administrative closeout procedures (see 4.804-5). 
(66) Determine that the contractor has a drug-free workplace program and drugfree 
awareness program (see Subpart 23.5). 
(67) Support the program, product, and project offices regarding program reviews, 
program status, program performance and actual or anticipated program problems. 
(68) Monitor the contractor's environmental practices for adverse impact on contract 
performance or contract cost, and for compliance with environmental requirements 
specified in the contract. ACO responsibilities include- 
(i) Requesting environmental technical assistance, if needed; 
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(ii) Monitoring contractor compliance with specifications requiring the use of 
environmentally preferable products, energy-efficient products, and materials or delivery 
of end products with specified recovered material content. This must occur as part of the 
quality assurance procedures set forth in Part 46; and 
(iii) As required in the contract, ensuring that the contractor complies with the reporting 
requirements relating to recovered material content utilized in contract performance (see 
Subpart 23.4). 
(69) Administer commercial financing provisions and monitor contractor security to 
ensure its continued adequacy to cover outstanding payments, when on-site review is 
required. 
(70) Deobligate excess funds after final price determination. 
(b) The CAO shall perform the following functions only when and to the extent 
specifically authorized by the contracting office: 
(1) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements incorporating contractor 
proposals resulting from change orders issued under the Changes clause. Before 
completing negotiations, coordinate any delivery schedule change with the contracting 
office. 
(2) Negotiate prices and execute priced exhibits for unpriced orders issued by the 
contracting officer under basic ordering agreements. 
(3) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements changing contract 
delivery schedules. 
(4) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements providing for the 
deobligation of unexpended dollar balances considered excess to known contract 
requirements. 
(5) Issue amended shipping instructions and, when necessary, negotiate and execute 
supplemental agreements incorporating contractor proposals resulting from these 
instructions. 
(6) Negotiate changes to interim billing prices. 
(7) Negotiate and definitize adjustments to contract prices resulting from exercise of an 
economic price adjustment clause (see Subpart 16.2). 
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(8) Issue change orders and negotiate and execute resulting supplemental agreements 
under contracts for ship construction, conversion, and repair. 
(9) Execute supplemental agreements on firm-fixed-price supply contracts to reduce 
required contract line item quantities and deobligate excess funds when notified by the 
contractor of an inconsequential delivery shortage, and it is determined that such action is 
in the best interests of the Government, notwithstanding the default provisions of the 
contract. Such action will be taken 
only upon the written request of the contractor and, in no event, shall the total downward 
contract price adjustment resulting from an inconsequential delivery shortage exceed 
$250.00 or 5 percent of the contract price, whichever is less. 
(10) Execute supplemental agreements to permit a change in place of inspection at origin 
specified in firm-fixed-price supply contracts awarded to non-manufacturers, as deemed 
necessary to protect the Government's interests. 
(11) Prepare evaluations of contractor performance in accordance with Subpart 42.15.(c) 
Any additional contract administration functions not listed in 42.302(a) and (b), or not 
otherwise delegated, remain the responsibility of the contracting office. 
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ATTACHMENT C. DCMA HQ ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
 
Chief, Special Staff (DS)
MG DARRYL SCOTT, USAF
COMMANDER
Reserve Affairs (DR) General Counsel (GC) Small Business (SB) Special Programs (SP) Std Business 
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Contract Management Operations (OC)
Executive Director





















CAPT Mike Trion, USN
Note:  This chart is used to demonstrate the DCMA HQ  
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Downward glide-slope set in the mid nineties 
when workload was on a steep decline –


















FY 90 FY 05
Long Term Reductions




Widening Workload vs. Resource Gap
•Increased workload
•Reduction in staff
•Need to improve customer service
 
Note: This chart was used in a multitude of DCMA briefings from HQ Level down to the 
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